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Abstract
Using an agent-based model we explore the model of slavery in modern business devel-
oped by Crane (2013). Taking the Spanish agricultural sector—specifically the area of
Campo de Dalı´as in Almerı´a where much of Europe’s vegetables are grown—as a case,
we find that labour exploitation flourishes in communities of like-minded companies that
do not care about mainstream norms. We confirm which socio-economic aspects of labour
demand/supply lead to slavery, while challenging the assumption that markets which are
dominated by few employers are more prone to exploiting workers. We find that, regard-
ing isolation and connectedness of employers, cluster e↵ects and intense inter-employer
communication are particularly e↵ective drivers of underpayment if the cluster is homoge-
nous in terms of wage level and if it is isolated from law-abiding employers. This means
that employers tend to confirm and reinforce each other in their illegal behaviour, thus cre-
ating enclaves in which non-standard norms prevail and worker exploitation is regarded
as legitimate. On the other hand, we see that breaking the isolation of employees among
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Understanding labour exploitation in the Spanish agricultural
sector using an agent based approach
Abstract
Using an agent-based model we explore the model of slavery in modern business devel-
oped by Crane (2013). Taking the Spanish agricultural sector—specifically the area of
Campo de Dalı´as in Almerı´a where much of Europe’s vegetables are grown—as a case,
we find that labour exploitation flourishes in communities of like-minded companies that
do not care about mainstream norms. We confirm which socio-economic aspects of labour
demand/supply lead to slavery, while challenging the assumption that markets which are
dominated by few employers are more prone to exploiting workers. We find that, regard-
ing isolation and connectedness of employers, cluster effects and intense inter-employer
communication are particularly effective drivers of underpayment if the cluster is homoge-
nous in terms of wage level and if it is isolated from law-abiding employers. This means
that employers tend to confirm and reinforce each other in their illegal behaviour, thus cre-
ating enclaves in which non-standard norms prevail and worker exploitation is regarded
as legitimate. On the other hand, we see that breaking the isolation of employees among
each other only increases pay levels if there are law-abiding employers, pointing to the
potentially beneficial role social business and entrepreneurs, state-owned companies, or
public entrepreneurs could play for transforming labour conditions of entire markets.
Keywords: Spanish agriculture, diffusion of slavery, agent based model, unethical labour
practices
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1. Introduction
Despite numerous laws prohibiting the practice, slavery still exists in a number of
forms today including chattel slavery, which is probably what most people think of when
they hear the term. More common are debt bondage, where people borrow money and
must work for the lender to re-pay it; and contract slavery, which masquerades as legiti-
mate work but the promised pay and conditions are not fulfilled [9]. This paper considers
contract slavery, with slavery defined as being paid less than the minimum wage1.
In his theory of modern slavery as a management practice, Crane [15] mentions the use
of slave labour in the Spanish agricultural industry. According to the European Union’s
Farm Structure Survey [64] Spain has 989,800 agricultural holdings; Spanish farms em-
ploy a permanent workforce of 2.2 million people (including family members), equivalent
to 9.8% of Spain’s total economically active population. However, this permanent work-
force is supplemented by temporary labour that is hired formally and informally as needed.
The Foundation [21] estimates a number of 8,400 slaves in Spain although it should also
be noted that modern slavery is only the most extreme form on a wider spectrum of labour
exploitation. Agriculture is high risk for modern slavery due to manual processing and
labour being a high proportion of the production costs [7] and its informal and temporary
employment practices [28]. In a deeper analysis of one particular case, Lawrence [39]
reports that illegal migrant workers from Africa working on fruit and vegetable farms in
Almerı´a are routinely paid less than half the legal minimum wage, under threats to report
them to the police if they complain. Almerı´a has become a major source of fresh produce,
and its greenhouses are used to grow food all year round. There are an estimated 40,000
hectares of greenhouses in Campo de Dalı´as, the largest concentration in the world [62].
Views of the region from Google Earth show it to be almost completely white by being
1Therefore we are really discussing sweatshop labour.
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covered in plastic, earning it the nickname ‘Costa del Polythene’. Over 2.7 million tonnes
of produce are grown on its plains each year, accounting for over e1.2 billion in economic
activity2.
Lawrence [39] describes the experience of one immigrant in Almerı´a. The man arrived
illegally in southern Spain from Morocco in 2004 to work in the greenhouses, having paid
e1,000 to smugglers to bring him in a fishing boat. In 2004 he could earn e30 for eight
hours’ labour. In 2011 he considered himself “lucky” if he could make e20 a day. The
legal minimum wage for a day’s work is more thane44. The situation of migrants working
in Almerı´a got so desperate that the Red Cross and other charities began to hand out free
food to many thousands of them.
Based specifically on the Almerı´a case, and drawing on analyses by Acemoglu and
Wolitzky [1] we build an agent-based model to explore the Almerı´a case and the implica-
tions of Crane’s theory. Many analyses of our model are possible but here we concentrate
on the diffusion of slavery and anti-slavery practices through the industry, an investigation
of socialisation both among workers and among employers, an examination of the effects
of employer number and size, and how to fight slavery through inspection.
2. Background
Labour exploitation is an inherent and general risk in today’s capitalist system that is
fuelled by a vast pool of young people [45]and that strives for efficiency gains by reduc-
ing costs for inputs of materials, capital and labour. While this principal inclination holds
across all industries, there are industry sectors and world regions where workers are more
vulnerable to exploitation [49], as for example the agricultural or small-scale mining sector
and developing world regions with high levels of resource-poor people [3, 46, 56]; taking
2Source: http://geographyfieldwork.com/CostadelPolythene.htm
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one case, Sozinho et al. [57] highlight the historical association of the Brazilian sugarcane
industry with labour and human rights abuses such as labour exploitation including forms
of forced and slave labour. There are also areas in industrialized countries where a high
percentage of exploitation prone individuals (i.e. trafficked people or refugees) gather, as
for example Southern Spain and the South of the United States [34]. Although there are
still fervent debates around the exact meaning, usefulness and use of the term “modern
slavery” [e.g. 17], it is largely unambiguous that variants of contemporary slavery rep-
resent severe forms of labour exploitation. So far the management literature has largely
neglected these phenomena of slavery, but recently a few scholars have started to concep-
tualize and build theory from a distinct business angle, by addressing modern slavery as a
management practice [15], and as a side effect of domestic or international supply chains,
unwanted but difficult to tackle [28, 50, 60].
Fighting labour exploitation in its severest forms is directly aligned with the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) as proposed by the United Nations, namely the goal of
promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for
all (Goal 8), but also the goal of ending poverty in all its forms (Goal 1). Simultaneously,
labour explotation indirectly impedes the achievement of a couple of further SDGs such as
good health and well-being (Goal 3), reduced inequalities (Goal 10), responsible consump-
tion and production patterns (Goal 12), but also environmental goals such as climate action
(Goal 13) or the sustainbale use of marine and terrestrial eco-systems (Goal 14 and 15).
Abolishing labour exploitation is also embedded in key business guidelines. The United
Nations Global Compact, for example, addresses major violations of decent work through
principle 4 (elimination of forced labour) and principle 5 (abolition of child labour), very
similar to the stipulations of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Other
guidelines such as the CAUX Principles preclude labour exploitation by emphasizing the
dignity of every employee and the rightfulness of employees to represent their interests.
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Similarly, research on sustainability of agrifood production systems acknowledges labour
exploitation as serious problem and refer to the key issues of labour rights [26], compen-
sation, and the abolition of illigal labour such as forced, bonded and child labour [44].
Missimer et al. [48] define a socially sustainable society as one in which people are not
subject to structural obstacles to health, influence, competence, impartiality and meaning-
making. The objective of health may be compromised by labour exploitation for exam-
ple through excessive working hours, unsafe work conditions, abuse of workers, forced
and child labour as well as insufficient compensation. This goes in line with Stanisˇkiene˙
and Stankevicˇiu¯te˙ [59] who found that from an employee perspective, fair employment
practices including worker compensation and health and safety are important and highly
correlated constituents of social sustainability.
Although Hahn et al. (2010) emphasize and conceptualize the existence of trade-offs
and conflicts between the economic, social and environmental dimension of sustainability
[29], there is still common ground that there are multiple win-win relationships and that in
principle all dimensions of sustainability are to be addressed simultaneously and equitably
[19]. It has been pointed out by Bales [6] that there is a vicious circle between severe forms
of labour exploitation and environmental degradation, as exploitative business models of-
ten destroy the environment—locally and beyond—which deprives communities of the
opportunity to make a decent living. This makes population groups vulnerable to become
enslaved and to be forced to wreck the environment further.
The interlinkage between slavery and labour exploitation and environmentally unsus-
tainable behaviour is increasingly evidenced in research. Bales [6] for example argues in
his book Blood and Earth that if slaves were a country, they’d be the world’s third largest
emitter of CO2 after China and the US. Slave villages in Brazil can be easily differentiated
from free villages on satellite images as slaves live intrinsically unsustainably and for ex-
ample do not establish community routines for waste disposal. Boyd et al. [13] and Luby
5
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
et al. [42] show that a clear link between exploitation and polluting production methods
can be made and identified through remote sensing; vice versa, a deterioration of the natu-
ral environment puts economic pressures on communities that make them more vulnerable
to exploitation.
Against this background it is of particular interest to understand how slavery and other
forms of severe labour exploitation may persist although being outlawed by legal systems
around the world and despised by mainstream norms. Drawing on institutional theory and
the strategic capabilities literature, Crane [15] attempts to explain how this happens, focus-
ing on how organisations that use slavery exploit particular competitive and institutional
conditions from which slavery emerges, insulate themselves from forces that work against
slavery, and sustain the conditions that enable slavery to survive. In his framework, the
determinants of the likelihood of slavery are broken down into conditions related to the in-
dustry context and conditions related to the broader institutional context involving regula-
tive, normative and cultural cognitive systems. This context encapsulates socioeconomic,
geographical, cultural and regulatory factors. The framework that Crane develops leads to
a number of propositions that explain the practice of slavery; in the following, we present
the five enabling conditions that increase the likelihood of slavery according to Crane [15].
The propositions are as follows, illustrated in Figure 13:
Proposition 1. A conducive industry context (namely, high labor intensity, low value dis-
tribution, high elasticity of demand, low industry legitimacy, and high regional clustering)
will lead to a greater likelihood that enterprises will adopt slavery.
Proposition 2. The availability of a socio-economically disadvantaged population (namely,
3We focus on the macro contingency factors that drive slavery, which Propositions 1 to 5 concern. Propo-
sitions 6 and 7 are more organisational and we therefore do not consider them here.
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high [relative] poverty, low education, and high unemployment) will lead to a greater like-
lihood that enterprises will adopt slavery.
Proposition 3. A conducive geographic context (namely, high geographic isolation of the
enterprise and high physical/political/psychological distance of workers) will lead to a
greater likelihood that enterprises will adopt slavery.
Proposition 4. A supportive cultural context (with respect to traditions, entrenched in-
equalities, and religious beliefs) will lead to a greater likelihood that enterprises will
adopt slavery.
Proposition 5. An accommodating regulatory context (characterized by weak governance
and low issue attention with respect to slavery) will lead to a greater likelihood that enter-
prises will adopt slavery.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Crane’s first proposition features a conducive industry context. Factors making an
industry conducive are high labour intensity, unfavourable value distribution along sup-
ply chains, high elasticity of labour demand, low industry legitimacy, and high regional
clustering. This means that slavery is more likely to be found in labour-intense non-
technological work such as agriculture, brick-making, mining, garment and textiles, do-
mestic service, or forest clearing [7]. Furthermore, distribution inequity of risks and re-
wards along the supply chain may incite enterprises to radically decrease labour costs in
order to stay profitable [63]. In a similar way, high elasticity of labour demand may make
companies strive for their business goals in terms of profit margin and market share by
pushing down labour costs beyond legal limits. Here criminal entrepreneurs may exploit
business opportunities that are categorically foreclosed for others and lead to a net social
7
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loss [31]. Low legitimacy of industry, such as domestic work, illegal mining [56], sex
work [32], and other work that is deemed illegitimate [11], together with regional clus-
tering, increases the cohesion within the group of criminal peers (cf. [58]) and hence the
likelihood of occurrence of slavery.
The second proposition suggests that a pool of socioeconomically disadvantaged pop-
ulation, i.e. poor, badly-educated and unemployed people, leads to a greater likelihood of
slavery [15]. It has been widely acknowledged in research and policy reports that indeed
economic and social exclusion of people are the breeding ground for crime, corruption
[30]and human right violations such as slavery (e.g., [52, 38, 66, 10, 14, 2]). Although
the traditional link between race and slavery has lost most of its importance, race, eth-
nicity and religion may still play some role in excluding people from proper societal and
economic participation and hence forces people into slavery [8].
Crane’s third proposition suggests that a conducive geographic context will lead to
a greater likelihood of slavery. Geographic isolation shelters slaveholders from external
intervention; therefore slavery often occurs in remote areas that are difficult to access, such
as rainforest or mountainous areas, or areas that are shielded by circumstances of armed
conflicts [28]. In addition, distance of workers enhances their vulnerability to be exploited
as slaves; distance may refer to sheer physical distance of trafficked people from their
home place, political distance if national borders have been crossed (even more if crossed
illegally), regulatory distance when commmunities are situated in remote areas [56], and
psychological distance from their social and communal ties and other constituents of their
self-identity [15].
As fourth proposition, [15] suggests the supportive cultural context to be an important
driving force for the occurrence of slavery. Such a supportive cultural context refers to
norms, religious beliefs and other deeply-rooted convictions regarding the acceptability
and legitimacy [cf. 11] of exploiting certain minority or marginalized groups. Such cultural
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context based on informal rules and norms can exert lots of power [18] even if it clashes
with formal rules as for example manifested in national legal systems [cf. 51].
Finally, Crane’s fifth hypothesis suggests that an accommodating regulatory context
and insufficient enforcement of regulation supports the adoption of slavery - in the same
way as other crimes such as corruption [55]. Where governance and democratic rights are
only weakly set in place and ineffectively executed, slavery cannot be suitably contained
and may spread if driven by ‘criminal entrepreneurs’ [16] and supported by other socio-
economic context factors. The effectiveness of governance is also influenced by ‘issue
attention’ [15] on the political agenda, i.e. the devotion and resources committed to en-
forcing anti-slavery legislation and mitigating the conditions facilitating slavery. As slaves
are often illegal immigrants or otherwise politically marginalized people, their political
power and voice are minor to non-existent [33] and society cannot easily evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of a government’s anti-slavery policies and measures since it is not readily
visible. This constitutes a violation of the second social sustainability principle proposed
by Missimer et al. [48]and labelled ”influence”, saying that people should be able, in gen-
eral, to shape the social systems they are part of by participation.
While these propositions gain authority by being anchored in institutional theory [54],
and they seem in large parts intuitively valid from a common sense perspective, they still
warrant more in-depth investigation to corroborate and enhance the conceptualisation and
understanding of what conditions make slavery persist or develop in certain areas. It is
indeed this dynamic perspective that Crane [15] considers only implicitly, that appears to
be fruitful for understanding how conditions of slavery and other forms of labour exploita-
tion spread throughout a regional industry or other sector, and for concluding by which
means—in terms of business practices and policy settings—unethical and unsustainable
business practices can be confined. This angle links to emerging research on how uneth-
ical business practices develop and spread over time [36], such as dynamics of corrupt
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routines in the private sector [22, 55] or key drivers and interdependencies of unsustain-
able commercial activities [61]. Our agent-based model for investigating the conditions
under which labour exploitation persists in the agricultural sector of Southern Spain, fol-
lows on similar modelling work that tries to understand the development and implications
of (un-)sustainable business conduct [41] or the development of an industrial symbiosis,
i.e. a dynamic collaborative network of industrial actors [23].
3. The model
The use of agent-based models in the social sciences is not common but is established
[37, 12, 65, 47, 24, 43] and a robust philosophy underpins its use [67]. See for instance
Amini et al. [4]. Our approach to developing the model of the Almerı´a agricultural case is
based largely on the work of Bainbridge [5] and Epstein [20]4. We develop the model to
investigate the propositions put forward by Crane [15].
There are two types of agent: employers and workers. An employer’s objective is to
employ the workforce they require at a minimum cost. Employers can change the amount
of money they pay as a percentage of full minimum wage. Employees can accept or refuse
an offer of work, and can eventually leave the area to do something else if they have been
out of work for a long enough time or if they cannot earn enough.
There are links between employers representing lines of communication between neigh-
bouring farms, and links among workers representing workers meeting and sharing infor-
mation with each other. Employers have a ‘workers needed’ constant which is the number
of employees they need in each time period and a workforce w variable which stores the
4Bainbridge uses a variance function to capture how intensely people believe in a god; we use a max
function to capture how legitimate people believe it is to pay less than minimum wage. Epstein models
citizens and police who decide to riot and arrest rioters respectively; we model employers and workers who
decide whether to make and accept an offer of employment.
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number of employees they actually have in a time period. Workers needed is dictated by
exogenous industry forces. They have an array l which stores their legitimacy of pay. This
determines how much they pay their employees. They have a profit variable to store their
revenue. Employers have variable links to other employers and a heteronomy constant h
which is a measure of how much influence neighbouring employers have on how much
is paid. Lastly employers have a vision which is how far they are able to ‘see’ in order
to employ workers. The model is not strictly spatial – the agents do not walk to work for
instance; vision is simply a way of ensuring that employers are not always able to employ
workers from each of the four areas where workers stay and is stored as a percentage of
the area (Almerı´a) within which any employees can be offered work.
Each time period represents one work cycle (a ‘day’) meaning that all decisions to
offer and accept work are made in each time period and pay and revenue is calculated
for that time. Each day, employers can employ a workforce of up to size w. Employers
ask workers if they want to work and workers can refuse. Employers should pay every
worker a minimum wage but some pay less than this by making unreasonable reductions
or simply by downright illegality. The decision on what to pay comes from their perceived
legitimacy of paying under the minimum wage, which is determined by 1) what neigh-
bouring employers pay and 2) whether they are able to employ their full workforce from
their potential workforce, which is the number of workers within their locality. Employers’
heteronomy h moderates both of these.
An employer’s perceived legitimacy of pay is stored in an array l of 4 numbers rep-
resenting the legitimacy of four levels of pay: full minimum wage, and 80%, 60% and
40% of minimum wage. The choice of what an employer will pay is whichever of the four
memory ‘slots’ in the array contains the highest number. At the start these numbers are
set randomly but over time will come to be shaped by the two determinants listed above in
the following two ways:
11
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
1. Let l1 = 1 be the position in the array representing a choice of 40% of minimum
wage, l2 = 2 be 60%, l3 = 3 be 80%, and l4 = 4 be 100%. Then the initially random
number in one of these slots l∗ is increased by that agent’s heteronomy h with
l∗ = lmax − ||
∑n
i=1 lmax − li
n
||
where lmax is the slot in l which stores the highest number, n is the number of neigh-
bours and li is the choice of neighbour i.
In plain terms this means that if an employer’s neighbours pay more than him, his per-
ception of the legitimacy of paying more will increase (which is the same as his perception
of the legitimacy of paying less will decrease). If his neighbours pay less than him, his
perception of the legitimacy of paying less will increase. If some neighbours are paying
more and some less it is possible these will cancel out and his perception of the legitimacy
of what he is currently doing will increase. The higher his heteronomy then the larger will
be his neighbours’ impact on his perception. Eventually the change in his perception of
legitimacy may impact on behaviour if l∗ becomes lmax. It is assumed that employers share
information about their wages freely with their neighbours.
At the end of each day employers do not examine their revenue directly but rather
consider their employees, as it is through their employees that they generate revenue. On
any day, if w reaches the maximum workforce an employer can possibly employ and lmax
is that employer’s choice, then if lmax > 1 (i.e. he is not already paying the least possible),
the value in slot lmax − 1 is increased by h. If w is less than the maximum and lmax < 4 (i.e.
he is not already paying the maximum), the value in slot lmax + 1 is increased by h. In plain
terms this means that if an employer can fill his workforce then he might start to think that
he can get away with paying less. If he cannot, he might consider paying more.
When employees decide whether to accept an offer of work, two things are considered:
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how long they have been out of work and their experience of the employer. Unemployed
workers will accept an offer of employment if they did not work yesterday (days not work-
ing d > 1). If things get so desperate (d > T where T is a variable threshold) then a worker
will leave the industry to do something else, which could be going to a foodbank/other
charity or—perhaps more unlikely—returning home.
The modeller can set workers to be able to move or not. If workers are allowed to
move they can meet workers in other areas who may report better wages. If this happens
the worker will move to the new area (which may put them within the vision of more
employers).
Each day there is a probability pi that an inspector assesses an employer and, if they
are paying slave wages, shutting them down and being removed from the simulation upon
which a new employer takes their place.
Employers learn what to pay workers based on the formulae above. Workers remember
good or bad experiences from working with employers and share these with other workers.
A worker’s experience of an employer could either be direct, from working for them in the
past, or it could come from someone they know. Each worker stores their experience as the
percentage of the minimum wage they were paid by that employer (or a flag value if they
have not previously worked for that employer). When workers meet to share information,
an average is taken of one worker’s personal experience and the experience of the worker
they are meeting (their ‘contact’). If the contact has experience but the worker does not,
then the worker simply accepts the contact’s word and sets their experience equal to their
contact’s. Each worker has a tolerance level for low pay stored as a percentage. They will
accept any offer of work from an employer who they believe from experience will pay at
least as high a percentage of the minimum wage as their tolerance.
The simulation is set with n workers and m employers, and no one is initially employed.
At the start, a randomly selected employer begins the process by asking workers within
13
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his vision whether they will work for the day.
3.1. Validation
The model was validated by examining how well it captures Crane’s propositions.
Each proposition is now presented and then a short analysis given of how the model’s
behaviour matches it. For the validation, we used the following as our baseline parameter
settings:
1. there is one job for all workers,
2. there is zero chance of inspection,
3. workers are not free to move from area to area (from slum to slum),
4. employers have large enough vision to see all workers (their ‘locality’ is the entire
space, that is, all the slums),
5. each employer makes links with two others,
6. each day, workers get to meet four other workers from their area,
7. workers have a tolerance for low pay of 0.8.
We examine average pay after 200 days to allow the system to settle into its behaviour,
and take an average over 100 simulations. Table 1 shows the results of the statistical tests
used; Figure 2 illustrates the validation.
Proposition 1. A conducive industry context (namely, high labour intensity, low value dis-
tribution, high elasticity of demand, low industry legitimacy, and high regional clustering)
will lead to a greater likelihood that enterprises will adopt slavery.
This is largely a super-proposition that is explored in more detail in the propositions
that follow. We consider it to be axiomatically correct and do not consider it in the valida-
tion.
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Proposition 2. The availability of a socio-economically disadvantaged population (namely,
high [relative] poverty, low education, and high unemployment) will lead to a greater like-
lihood that enterprises will adopt slavery.
The model does not consider education. Poverty and affordable credit are included
together as impacting on the decision to refuse an offer of work. High unemployment is
modelled by adjusting the number of jobs in the industry per worker and the proposition is
supported. When the number of jobs per person increases, average pay increases and vice
versa, as predicted by the proposition.
Proposition 3. A conducive geographic context (namely, high geographic isolation of the
enterprise and high physical/political/psychological distance of workers) will lead to a
greater likelihood that enterprises will adopt slavery.
This proposition was only partially supported. When workers are free to move to loca-
tions where better wages are available, average pay increases, as predicted by the proposi-
tion, although the result was not statistically significant. This is labelled ‘Proposition 3a’
in Table 1. However, when the number of links among employers increases, that is, when
they are not isolated (labelled ‘Proposition 3b’) wages tend to rise.
Proposition 4. A supportive cultural context (with respect to traditions, entrenched in-
equalities, and religious beliefs) will lead to a greater likelihood that enterprises will
adopt slavery.
This is captured in the model by each employer’s legitimacy array. When the legiti-
macy of paying less increases, wages decrease, in line with the proposition.
Proposition 5. An accommodating regulatory context (characterized by weak governance
and low issue attention with respect to slavery) will lead to a greater likelihood that enter-
prises will adopt slavery.
15
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A regulatory context is included in the model as the chance of inspections. For this test
when employers are found to employ workers at slave wages they receive a fine for a set
number of days, which impacts on average pay as predicted by the proposition.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
4. Analysis
4.1. Philosophy of simulation
We take seriously the view of Borrill and Tesfatsion [12], that agent-based modelling
is an appropriate mathematics for the social sciences. We treat our agent-based model
(ABM) as the phenomenon under study: we set parameters, give the initial conditions as
a set of inputs, and run the ABM to generate the output. We treat that output as we would
treat data generated by experiment, using graphical techniques and linear regression to
analyse the results. We analyse the output both against time and as a snapshot at days
d = 200, as we did for the validation. All of these approaches are common in social
science.
We are exploring the implications of Crane’s propositions when the entire model is
run, unlike during validation where we hold constant the parts of the model that we are not
validating. We are interested in what emerges from the model, when all the rules are run
together, and may interact and moderate each other in unpredictable ways (in fact this is
something we want to see). Therefore results shown in our analysis here may seemingly
contradict the validation. This is the nature of agent models and is discussed at length in
Section 5.1.
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4.2. Determinants of slavery
We first examine the determinants of slavery using average final pay paid by employers
as our measure of slavery (Table 2). The table shows our main results and we discuss it in
the following subsections, running additional analyses as necessary to delve deeper. The
headline is that links between employers and availability of workers appear as statistically
significant and are important determinants of slavery: As socialisation among employers
(links) and availability of workers increase, pay decreases.
The diffusion of slavery is first determined by the number of workers available. This
is captured in the employer vision variable (which is a measure of how many workers an
employer can access each day). The more workers they have access to, the more likely
it is that they pay less than minimum. Next, links between employers allow slavery to
diffuse (more links leads to less pay). This is contrary to Proposition 3 which states that
high geographic isolation of the enterprise will lead to slavery. The reason is that poor
conditions can become normalized in an isolated enterprise. However the reverse of this—
that poor practise will become difficult to justify when surrounded by good practise—can
only apply if good practise exists. Otherwise poor practise will only become embedded:
an employer being linked to a slaver allows their bad practices to spread.
We can isolate how much of a difference a group of responsible and irresponsible
employers make by manipulating the legitimacy array. By introducing a single employer
who will never pay a legal wage, and a single employer who will never pay less than
minimum wage, we can see the impact this has on the diffusion of slavery as measured by
a count of employers paying less than minimum. Tables 3 and 4 show the results. A single
good employer was able to significantly reduce the number of slavers by a small amount.
A single bad employer made no difference.
[Table 2 about here.]
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[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
4.3. Socialisation
Our results show little support for the notion that workers sharing information about
employers can have a positive impact. In theory, if workers can share data and move about
then they should be able to engineer better conditions for themselves. However again this
logic relies on there being well paid jobs around and in fact what we find is that, as more
workers get to socialise, all that happens is that bad experiences are shared. This points to
the necessity of a workforce unionising in order to improve conditions, which is sadly not
an option for the workers discussed here who are in the country illegally.
4.4. Number and size of employers
We vary the number and size of the employers and their required workforces to as-
sess the impact this has on average wages. Table 5 shows the results on the number of
employers. We held number of workers constant and varied the number of employers,
adjusting the workforce in the industry so that there is a potential job for every worker, but
dividing this by the number of employers so that each employer requires the same size for
workforce. (Note that the variable ‘workforce’ does not appear in the table as it is related
to the variable ‘employers’ and would therefore introduce to a multicollinearity problem.)
There are two ways we might think about the relationship between number of employers
in an industry and average pay. The first is that a small number of employers will abuse
their market power and pay below minimum wage. The second is a ‘safety in numbers’
rationale – if many employers are paying less than minimum wage it becomes easier for a
new employer to pay less, as they likely feel there is less chance of getting caught. We see
an inverse relationship between average pay and number of employers: more employers
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leads to less pay. Our analysis of the agent model supports the safety in numbers view:
when there were more employers—all of equal size—wages fell.
[Table 5 about here.]
4.5. Inspection
A random inspection resulting in a fine made no significant impact on condition. Re-
placing this with the threat of jail led to a very different outcome. In the jail version of the
simulation, a random inspection of a employer paying less than minimum leads to them
being removed from the simulation to be replaced by a new independent agent, which is to
say, one with a fresh, initially randomized legitimacy matrix. Results are shown in Table
6 and we note that the impact of this outcome on pay is greater and more significant than
any other variable in all of the previous analyses.
[Table 6 about here.]
5. Discussion
Our analysis furthers the understanding of factors which drive exploitative practices in
the Spanish agricultural sector, and hence preclude social responsibility [44] and sustain-
ability [25] within the agrifood sector as well as within societies in general [48]. Results
may be generalized with some caution to other similar situations as for example the agri-
cultural sector in the Southern United States. Our agent-based modelling approach shows
that it can be helpful to investigate in an in-depth way the inner logic of conceptually
derived research propositions by modelling techniques, next to proposition testing and
refinement through empirical research techniques.
In terms of industry context, our analysis underlines that the number of links between
employers enforces a cluster effect that helps spread bad practice. Contrary to the assump-
tion that markets that are dominated by a few or only one employer are more prone to
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exploiting workers, we see an inverse relationship between average pay and number of
employers. This could be explained by the fact that a larger number of employers not pay-
ing minimum wage allows single dishonest employers to hide in the crowd as the number
of peers diminishes the perceived risk of being caught and punished by the legal system.
In terms of socio-economic conditions, our model confirms the commonly shared idea
that the pool of labourers looking for work increases the likelihood that slavery occurs
(e.g., [10]. This is a simple result of labour supply exceeding labour demand and not
too astonishing. It has been pointed out in literature that informed consent is not suffi-
cient to make transactions on the labour market morally justified if prevailing background
conditions do not grant much choice to workers [49]. More intriguing, however, are the
differentiated insights we get regarding the isolation and connectedness, respectively, of
employers and employees (i.e., the geographic context).
In fact, the cluster-effect and intense inter-employer communication is found to be a
particularly effective driver of underpayment, if the cluster is homogenous inside in terms
of wage level and if it is isolated from law-abiding employers. This means that employers
tend to confirm and reinforce each other in their illegal behaviour, thus creating enclaves of
non-standard norms that regard worker exploitations as legitimate means; these enclaves
are isolated from mainstream institutional settings that generally disapprove of practices
of labour exploitation. On the other hand, breaking the isolation of employees among
each other, i.e. reducing the psychological and social distance to their surroundings, only
reduces the underpayment if there are constantly law-abiding employers, i.e. employers
permanently paying at least minimum wage. This means that it is not enough to empower
workers and provide them more employment options to choose from, if there is not even
one good option among them. This finding may suggest the substantial benefit of mod-
els of social business and entrepreneurship [53], inclusive corporate social responsibility
initiatives [27], state-owned companies, or public entrepreneurs [35] meticulously com-
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plying with or even exceeding labour standards, as they can considerably increase (and
perhaps even transform) labour conditions of entire markets. Although it can be assumed
that state-owned companies in many cases are abiding more stringently to labour laws,
partly since they are not subject to the same profit expectations as most private companies,
it needs to be questioned whether altogether they always do more good for society.
Be that as it may, it is clear that labour exploitation flourishes in biotopes of like-
minded companies that do not care about mainstream norms. Indeed criminal attitudes
of profit maximisation at the expense of labour rights have become mainstream itself to
the detriment of overall social welfare. Therefore, in particular in labour-intense low-
technology sectors that are conducive to slavery such as agriculture or small-scale mining,
actors are required that break up such complicity, and that serve as beacons of good prac-
tice, and thus provide real choice to employees who are willing to emancipate themselves
from undue labour exploitation. At the same time those actors may raise awareness among
other employers and communities in general in order to change the inert conditions of en-
trenched beliefs and norms in favour of exploitation of certain minority or marginalized
groups.
The outstanding importance of the normative mindset of employers is underlined by
the observation that inspection and law enforcement is only effectively changing payment
habits by employers in a certain area if law and punishment can change the prevalent
norms within the group of employers. According to our analysis, fines as penalties that
merely reduce profit do not change the behaviour of employers. Prison sentences are more
powerful as they take bad employers out of the game. In reality, however, in the case of
a very high percentage of family business in the agricultural sector, business will likely
be continued by family members that are prone to adhere to a similar normative mindset
as the previously jailed employer. In this case, also prison sentences would not change
employer behaviour substantially. Such a change could only be brought about if jailed
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employers are replaced by independent new employers (featuring some chance of abiding
to the law), or even better, by certainly law abiding social entrepreneurs or state-owned
business. This means that in particular in slavery sensitive industries, severe contraven-
tions to labour rights should directly entail endeavours of introducing law-abiding or even
social value maximizing actors into the group of employers, driven by governmental and
private initiatives, or public-private partnerships. In terms of combination of informal and
formal institutions, our findings support Dixit [18] in the sense that formal institutions of
law and prosecution need to be reinforced by informal institutions within the (business)
community in order to exert optimal impact on the conduct of business.
In any case, successful prosecutions of instances of labour exploitation and slavery are
still rare today, which makes jail sentences appear rather unlikely. For the case of the UK,
for example, Lawrence [40] reports that when a supermarket’s supply chain was found
to employ slaves, the supermarket said it was shocked by the unacceptable conditions, the
Gangmaster Licensing Authority shut the worker supply agency down for abusing its staff,
and the company’s licence was revoked. However, no prosecution was ever brought, and
none of the workers’ lost pay was ever recovered or returned.
5.1. Limitations
The data for this paper were generated by an agent based model. There is a paradox
in developing agent models: researchers are interested in behaviour that emerges from
interaction rules; the software is not programmed to display this behaviour – it is written to
implement interaction rules; behaviour of interest emerges from these. Often emergence
happens in ways that can never be fully understood. This is unlike most software. The
paradox is this: if it can never be known what will emerge from a correctly written agent
program, how can we know that an agent program is correctly written? By definition,
black box testing—the idea of feeding input to the model where the output is already
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known, and then checking that this is what is actually produced—will not work properly
with an agent model. We may indeed have some test cases where we have a prediction
or even knowledge of how the model should behave. These usually come from subsets of
the interaction rules (something like testing: when employers behave a certain way and
workers do nothing differently, then a certain outcome should happen). However we likely
cannot know what will happen when all these rules are run together using the parameters
we are interested in – if we did know this, there would be no reason to construct the
model in the first place. Or perhaps we do know how the entire model should behave for
certain input and parameter settings but we want to explore fresh settings. To be clear on
this point: there is no reason to construct a model of a target unless we want to explore
the model beyond what we already know about the target; we must at some point go
somewhere that we have no knowledge of what the model should be doing.
All we can do is rely on theory. We recognise that the theory relied on here is under-
developed and because of this, our study should be considered to be exploratory, building
on Crane’s propositions.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that agent-based modelling can be used to further advance conceptual
research in areas where reliable empirical data is hard or impossible to access. Using an
agent model we have explored the implications of Crane’s theory of modern slavery. We
find that, regarding isolation and connectedness of employers, cluster effects and intense
inter-employer communication are particularly effective drivers of underpayment if the
cluster is homogenous in terms of wage level and if it is isolated from law-abiding em-
ployers. Anti-slavery interventions often focus on enabling networks and communication
between vulnerable workers. We show that the same is valid on the perpetrator side where
the cluster-effect allows employers to commonly reassure each other of the legitimacy of
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underpaying or exploiting workers. These are most likely to be enclaves that operate in
a geographically or socially separate setting, which in the past was amalgamated into the
effect of single dominant employers. Our study shows that the single dominant employer
effect and the separation effect must be considered not as one effect but two effects that
work in parallel.
Industries with few or one large employer are not necessarily more prone to exploita-
tion. Networks of smaller employers can be equally or worse in causing modern slavery
allow perpetrators to hide in a crowd without the risk of being publicly exposed that a
large corporation would face. This opens further routes for research on the diffusion of
good and bad practices in the interplay between supply chains and market structures.
Our findings suggest that purely profit-reducing penalties in situations of complicity
amongst employers have no substantial effect. This questions the strength of corporate
intervention in countries where slavery is culturally supported with no functioning judicial
enforcement systems. Only by taking perpetrators out of the system entirely (for example
through imprisonment and barring from business conduct) and stopping a normatively
equal replacement slavery can be effectively challenged in a network of employers. This
indicates the importance of enforcement of criminal law including prison sentences for
ensuring good labour practices and transforming societies towards sustainability.
The agent based model was developed in Matlab and is available from the authors.
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Industry context
Disadvantaged population
Geographic context
Cultural context
Regulatory context
Modern slavery
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P4
P5
Figure 1: Crane’s propositions as considered in our agent model
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Figure 2: Illustration of the model validation. Thick lines show the propositions that were tested and sup-
ported.
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Parameter Baseline Intervention t p
Proposition 2
Jobs per worker 0.33 0.58 -3.3 0.002
Proposition 3a
Workers can move 0.36 0.40 -1.0 0.318
Proposition 3b
Isolation of employers 0.36 0.44 -2.2 0.030
Proposition 4
Legitimacy of low pay 0.33 0.10 -14.2 0.000
Proposition 5
Chance of inspection 0.49 0.80 -5.6 0.000
Table 1: Results of t-tests to compare variables under conditions as predicted by the propositions for the
model validation.
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Chance of inspection 0.0885 0.1127 0.79 0.4328
Number of workers 0.0001 0.0001 1.61 0.1078
Workforce required by employers 0.0000 0.0002 0.19 0.8477
Vision of employers -0.3043 0.0283 -10.77 0.0000
Links between employers -0.0199 0.0026 -7.74 0.0000
Socialisation among workers -0.0019 0.0014 -1.38 0.1691
Days before leaving -0.0154 0.0047 -3.28 0.0012
Can workers move -0.0020 0.0134 -0.15 0.8819
Table 2: Factors impacting on average pay in the industry
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Chance of inspection -1.2453 1.9567 -0.64 0.5247
Number of workers -0.0001 0.0010 -0.10 0.9234
Workforce required by employers 0.0036 0.0042 0.87 0.3850
Vision of employers 7.6900 0.4906 15.68 0.0000
Links among employers 0.6822 0.0447 15.26 0.0000
Socialisation among workers 0.0090 0.0243 0.37 0.7102
Days before leavings 0.2471 0.0814 3.04 0.0025
Can workers move? 0.1121 0.2328 0.48 0.6305
Irresponsible employer control 0.0333 0.2305 0.14 0.8851
Table 3: What difference does a bad employer make to the normal results?
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Chance of inspection -0.5822 1.9421 -0.30 0.7645
Number of workers -0.0008 0.0010 -0.77 0.4430
Workforce required by employers 0.0010 0.0042 0.24 0.8085
Vision of employers 8.4466 0.4980 16.96 0.0000
Links among employers 0.6666 0.0450 14.82 0.0000
Socialisation among workers 0.0152 0.0244 0.62 0.5348
Days before leaving 0.1861 0.0824 2.26 0.0243
Can workers move? -0.0025 0.2340 -0.01 0.9916
Responsible employer control -0.4656 0.2355 -1.98 0.0485
Table 4: What difference does a good employer make to the normal results?
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Chance of inspection -0.0751 0.1531 -0.49 0.6243
Number of employers -0.0019 0.0007 -2.91 0.0040
Number of workers -0.0000 0.0001 -0.18 0.8600
Vision of workers -0.2474 0.0399 -6.20 0.0000
Links among employers -0.0174 0.0036 -4.82 0.0000
Socialisation among workers -0.0008 0.0020 -0.41 0.6838
Days before leaving -0.0024 0.0067 -0.36 0.7193
Can workers move? 0.0118 0.0186 0.64 0.5256
Table 5: Varying number of employers
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Chance of inspection 0.4232 0.0564 7.50 0.0000
Number of workers -0.0000 0.0000 -1.00 0.3172
Workforce required 0.0000 0.0001 0.40 0.6883
Vision of employers -0.0426 0.0141 -3.01 0.0028
Links among employers 0.0000 0.0013 0.03 0.9790
Socialisation among workers -0.0002 0.0007 -0.29 0.7720
Days before leaving -0.0034 0.0023 -1.44 0.1503
Can workers move? 0.0054 0.0067 0.80 0.4220
Table 6: Determinants of average final pay when inspections lead to jail
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